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Screen-Scraping and Harmful

Cybertrespass After Intel
by George H. Fibbe"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The topic for this Symposium, "The Internet: Place, Property, or
Thing-All or None of the Above," touches on a debate that has existed
since the early days of the Internet. There is no question that people
commonly understand their experience using the Internet with the help
of spatial metaphor--e.g., "sites" and "addresses" that we "visit," and
programs called "robots," "crawlers," and "spiders." Leaving metaphor
aside, many of the constituent parts of the Internet, especially computer
servers, are items of private personal property.
Indeed, the debate over metaphor is reminiscent of the scene from the
movie Field of Dreams' in which Shoeless Joe Jackson looks out over
the magical baseball field and asks, "Is this heaven?"2 The response is,
"No, it's Iowa."3 Similarly, whether we consider our interaction with the
Internet broadly--"Is this cyberspace?"--or more narrowly-"No, it's just
a group of computers"-is a particularly timely topic for courts deciding
disputes over "screen-scraping."
Many writers have criticized the "cyberspace-as-place" metaphor and
its effect on judicial reasoning. Essentially, critics contend that the
cyberspace-as-place metaphor has driven courts down the wrong path.
These writers often object to courts' use of this metaphor because of the

* Associate in the firm of Yetter & Warden, L.L.P., Houston, Texas. BirminghamSouthern College (B.A., summa cum laude, 1997); Harvard Law School (J.D., 2001).
I would like to thank Paul Yetter and Professor David Hricik for their input and
assistance with this Article. I would also like to thank the Mercer Law Review for inviting
me to speak at this Symposium.
1. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Studios 1989).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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public policy implications of strong property rights on the Internet. This
is especially true of screen-scraping cases applying traditional trespass
doctrine to the Internet.
It is unlikely, though, that courts are blindly riding the cyberspace-asplace metaphor to reach results dramatically different from those they
would otherwise reach. Enough room exists in the still-unsettled
trespass doctrine and in available analogies for courts to reach differing
results. Indeed, courts both enjoining cybertrespasses and refusing to
enjoin them have openly resisted certain metaphors. Thus, judicial
decisions may be driven more by a mundane balancing of interests than
by confusion regarding the appropriate cyberspace metaphor. Specifically, courts are more likely to favor property owners when trespassers
cause substantial commercial harm, which is common in screen-scraping
cases.
The California Supreme Court's recent decision in Intel Corp. v.
Hamidi4 may be an example of this balancing. In Intel the court acted
against a general willingness among courts to apply the doctrine of
trespass to cyberspace misbehavior.5 The majority even criticized the
dissent's use of various spatial analogies,6 and some may contend that
the court in Intel simply avoided confusing metaphors. In terms of the
interests of the litigants that were at stake, however, Intel was different
from most cybertrespass cases because it was not a purely commercial
dispute. Intel lacked evidence of a threat of serious commercial harm
that generally weighs in favor of owner protection, and it concerned
somewhat unique, individual free-speech claims.7
Because of its noncommercial setting, Intel does not signal a reversal
of courts' willingness to enjoin cyberspace trespasses by screen-scrapers.
At the least, Intel is a poor vehicle for assessing the interests of website
owners against commercially harmful scrapers.
II.

WHAT COURTS HAVE DONE
The path courts have taken in applying trespass-to-chattels to protect
website owners from screen-scraping has been well noted but is worth
a brief review.
Screen-scraping, also called data aggregation or indexing, encompasses
technologies variously referred to as robots, spiders, crawlers, or

4. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
5. Id. This willingness to enjoin applies not only to screen-scraping, but also to
unsolicited commercial e-mail, or "spare." See, e.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
6. Intel, 71 P.3d at 310 n.7.
7. Id. at 303-12.
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automated devices. Disputes over screen-scraping tend to be between
business actors and involve unauthorized access to websites for profit,
all to the commercial detriment of the website owner.8 Like cases
involving spain, screen-scraping disputes commonly include efforts by
website owners to block the unauthorized access, as well as scrapers'
evasion of such protections.
The first court to apply trespass-to-chattels to computer misbehavior
was a California court in the 1996 case of Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 9
which concerned teenagers hacking into a telephone company's computer
system. In the process, the teenagers were trying to find authorization
codes that would allow them to make free long-distance phone calls. The
teens managed to overburden the system and denied some phone
customers service. The trial court found the teens liable for conversion.1" The appellate court affirmed but avoided the question of
whether intangible computer access codes could be the subject of
conversion by holding that the judgment was correct as a trespass-tochattels claim.11
After Thrifty-Tel, Internet service providers brought a series of cases
against senders of unsolicited commercial e-mail, commonly known as
spam.
The most influential of these cases was CompuServe, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc.13 In this 1997 case, the court found that Cyber
Promotions's spam used up CompuServe's storage capacity and
processing power, thus diminishing the value to the company of its
computer systems.14 Also, CompuServe was losing customers because

8. One eBay witness referred to such software robots that do not respect website
owners' requests to stop scraping the website as "rude robots." See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's
Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1066 n.14 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
9. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
10. Id. at 471-72.
11. Id. at 472. The court in Thrifty-Tel also found that the teenagers' conduct
constituted fraud because their actions misrepresented to the phone company's computer
system (its agent) that they were authorized users, a representation on which the computer
relied in granting access. Id. at 473-74. Other litigants and courts do not appear to have
pursued this theory to combat scraping, but it seems to be a relevant inquiry when
scrapers evade website owners' screening efforts by intentionally representing that they
are not unauthorized users.
12. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998); Am. Online,
Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie
Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Disc., Inc.,
121 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
13. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
14. Id. at 1022.
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of spam, and the court found that CompuServe's lost goodwill was
actionable under the trespass-to-chattels theory as well.'"
Interestingly, CompuServe tried to block Cyber Promotions's spam, but
the company managed to evade the blocking efforts by disguising the
identity of the sender.16 This "masking" or "aliasing" of one's Internet
address is a common practice of spammers and screen-scrapers alike and
turns up in almost all of the major cases on the subject."
One early and important screen-scraping case was EF CulturalTravel
BV v. Explorica, Inc.,"' decided in 2001. Former employees of EF
Cultural Travel BV ("EF"), a tour company, started a competing venture.
The new company, Explorica, hired software firm Zefer to develop a
screen-scraping tool, which Explorica used to compile EF's tour prices
from its website. Explorica then undercut EF's prices. EF obtained a
preliminary injunction against the scraping under the federal Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act.'9 The court of appeals upheld the injunction
because Explorica developed the scraper tool with EF information that
was covered by a confidentiality agreement signed by a former EF
employee.2" Thus, the scraping was without authorization and was
prohibited.2'
The first major application of trespass theory to screen-scraping was
Judge Whyte's now-famous opinion in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.22
That dispute arose after the well-known auction website could not come
to licensing terms with Bidder's Edge ("BE"), an auction "aggregator"
that wanted to list eBay auction items on its own website. When eBay's
technological efforts to block BE's access to its site were unsuccessful,

15.
16.
17.

Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1017.
See Intel, 71 P.3d at 301; see also Steve Fischer, When Animals Attack: Spiders and
Internet Trespass, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 139, 156 n.121 (2001) (noting that "proxy

servers" can be used to mask IP addresses and avoid efforts by website owners to block
access to the sites); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Shaping Competition on the Internet: Who Owns
Product and PricingInformation?, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1965, 1984-85 (2000).
18. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
19. Id. at 579-80 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2000)).
20. Id. at 582-85. The First Circuit later upheld the injunction against the software
designer, Zefer. See EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F. 58, 64 (1st Cir. 2003).
21. 274 F.3d at 583.
22. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000). Professor Mark Lemley has placed Internet
trespass cases in two categories-attempts to acquire information, and attempts to convey
information. See Mark A. Lemley, Placeand Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 540 (2003).
Note that attempts to acquire information on the Internet involve a prerequisite sending
of an electronic request for the information to the server on which it resides. Thus, in
screen-scraping cases, a trespass precedes a variety of other injuries that scrapers
potentially may commit.
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BE's software robots accounted for approximately 1.5 percent of the
traffic on eBay's site.2" The court recognized the reputational harm
eBay might suffer due to BE's scraping, especially when BE may not
have been displaying accurate or up-to-date information.24
More
central to the court's ruling was its recognition that eBay had a valuable
property interest in its server capacity, and that the use of that capacity
25
by BE deprived eBay of the use of some amount of that capacity.
Based on BE's scraping and the threat posed by BE's potential competitors accessing eBay's website, the court issued a preliminary injunction.26
Shortly after eBay, a different federal court in California refused to
grant a preliminary injunction against a company engaging in screenscraping in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.27 Tickets.com used
a spider to scrape event information from Ticketmaster's site so that
Tickets.com users could be routed directly to individual Ticketmaster
event pages if Tickets.com could not offer tickets for the event.2
In
Ticketmaster the court focused more on the information at issue and
seemed less concerned about how Tickets.com accessed that information.29 Because Ticketmaster failed to produce any evidence of harm
or potential harm to its computer system, the court declined to issue an
injunction.30 No evidence was before the court that Tickets.com's use
interfered with Ticketmaster's regular business, and, unlike in eBay,
3
there was no specter of "dozens or more parasites joining the fray." '
Also, the court did not recognize a substantial commercial harm caused
by Tickets.com's activity where ticket buyers were sent to Ticketmaster's
site to make their purchases.3 2
Six months after eBay, a federal court in New York decided Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.33 Register.com allowed users to register
Internet domain names. As part of its business, it sent to registrants

23. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
24. Id. at 1064.
25. Id. at 1071.
26. Id. at 1073.
27. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 10, 2000). The court had previously issued a minute order on the preliminary
injunction motion, stating that it intended only to announce a result, and not to make any
'pronouncements of legal significance." Id. at *1.
28. Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL
21406289 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2003), at *1-2 (slip copy).
29. See id. at *3-5.
30. Id. at *3.
31. 2000 WL 1887522, at *4.
32. Id.
33. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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commercial marketing communications if they chose to receive them.
Register.com also sold its list of recent registrants to other businesses on
a weekly basis but put restrictions on how buyers of the lists could
solicit the registrants' business. In a plan it called "Project Henhouse,"
Verio scraped registrants' contact information from Register.com's
website so it could solicit them for Verio's website support services.
Verio's business strategy included both screen-scraping and sending
spam.s4
Verio admitted its scraping used some portion of Register.com's
computer capacity, and the court noted that there was evidence that
without an injunction, Verio's competitors would join in the scraping. 5
In enjoining Verio, the court found that part of Register.com's irreparable harm included "lost opportunities to sell competing services to its
opt-in customers,""6 and loss of "reputation and goodwill with customers
and co-brand partners."37
3
In late 2001, in Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., '
defendant, Forms Processing, Inc. ("FPI"), copied Oyster's "metatags"
such that search engines would show a description of Oyster's products
39
and services but would then divert the searcher to FPI's website.
Relying on eBay, the court found that Oyster stated a claim for trespass
even though no evidence existed that FPIs actions were causing its
computer servers to malfunction. 40
In March 2003, the court in the on-going Ticketmaster case41 remained unconvinced and thus eliminated Ticketmaster's trespass claim
altogether.42 The court believed that Ticketmaster suffered no serious
At
commercial harm, and it never embraced the trespass theory.'
some point during the litigation, Tickets.com stopped its deep-linking
and sent users to Ticketmaster's homepage. It also stopped using a
44
The court
spider or crawler to access the Ticketmaster website.
found, again, that there was no evidence of damage to Ticketmaster's

34. Id. at 241-42.
35.

Id. at 250-51.

36. Id. at 248.
37. Id. The Second Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction against Verio based on
breach of the Register.com website use agreement, trespass-to-chattels, and the Lanham
Act. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 2004 WL 103400 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2004).
38. No. C-00-0724JCS, 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001).
39. Id. at *1-2.
40. Id. at *13.
41. Ticketmaster Corp., 2003 WL 21406289.
42. Id. at *3.
43. Id.
44. Id. at *1-2.
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computer system, no trespass-to-chattels, and the value of the informa45
tion taken and efforts to block Tickets.com's spider were not relevant.
The very next day, in a case carefully watched in the travel industry,
a Texas court in American Airiines, inc. v. FareChase,lnc." enjoined
a scraper from accessing American Airlines's AA.com website. 47 FareChase's software scraped American's webfares from the site and allowed
them to be distributed by traditional travel agents, who ordinarily could
not offer them. FareChase's scraping undermined American's program
designed to lower its $400 million annual distribution costs. 48 The
court found that FareChase's scraping caused various types of harm to
American and its computer system; it occupied American's computer
capacity; and, like the eBay case, there was the threat that without an
injunction other scrapers would add to the burden on American's website
infrastructure. 49 Thus, the court issued an injunction based, in part,
on trespass-to-chattels. 50

III.

WHAT COMMENTATORS HAVE SAID

The academic literature on those decisions, and particularly on eBay,
has been surprisingly negative. Although at least one scholar has
argued for the application of strict trespass-to-land rules to cyberspace
disputes,5 most have argued the opposite. Criticism of the trespass-tochattels theory includes suggestions that: (1) it is simply too old to have
any relevance to cyberspace; (2) it fails to grasp the technical nuances
of the Internet; and (3) it is too heavy-handed and does not allow for

45. Id. at *3.
46. No. 067-194022-02 (67th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Texas, Mar. 8, 2003) (order
granting temporary injunction), available at httpJ/www.eff.org/Cases/AA_v_FareChase/
200303 10preliminj.pdf. The Author was part of the team representing American Airlines
in obtaining the injunction.
47. Id. at *4-5.
48. Id. at *2-3.
49. Id. at *2-4.
50. Id. at *2. The court based its injunction on FareChase's trespass to chattels and
breach of the AA.com User Agreement, and it stated that FareChase's conduct may have
been a violation of the Texas Computer Crime statute. Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 33.02 (2004)).
51. See Richard A. Epstein, Cybertrespass,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 82-84 (2003). Epstein
stated:
To think of a fixed internet site, or the equipment that supports it, as though it
were a chattel or personal property is to miss the operative distinction of the
earlier law, where "movables" was often used as a synonym for personal property
and "immovables" as a synonym for real property. The blunt truth is that an
internet site is fixed in its cyberspace location ....
Id. at 83.
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balancing of interests, particularly the public interest in the free flow of
information. Also, some writers criticized eBay's understanding of the
"harm" required to sustain a trespass-to-chattels claim, and contend
there is little danger that screen-scrapers will crash websites.52
Most of the criticisms of the screen-scraping decisions focus on broad
public policy concerns. Some commentators argue that property owners'
rights to exclude screen-scrapers or other trespassers will stifle the free
flow of information that defines the Internet.5 3 This so-called "cyberspace enclosure movement"5' would prevent the emergence of new
comparison shopping tools and would create a digital "anticommons,"
trespassers, and the Internet
where ordinary Internet users would be
55
would atrophy into a virtual wasteland.
Also, some scholars express an underlying sense of injustice that
commercial actors seek to enforce antiquated notions of private property
in a heretofore "public" space-that is, businesses have taken advantage
of a vast public infrastructure without dedicating their property to the
public digital commons.5" Businesses might correctly counter that they
did not sign up to make a public donation when they invested millions
in their computer servers.
A few scholars, however, have supported the trespass theory.
Arguments in favor of trespass typically suggest that clear rights to
protect against unwanted access to computer property will help to
produce efficient outcomes. 57 In contrast, allowing trespass to go
without a private remedy would subject property owners to the

52. Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc., Appellant, Supporting
Reversal at 15, Bidder's Edge, Inc. v. eBay Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-15995) (arguing that
because aggregators depend on information from target websites, they have incentives to
prevent those sites from crashing). There would likely be a collective action problem for
scrapers attempting to coordinate their activities.
53. See, e.g., Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REv. 521, 527 n.24 (2003)
(listing articles criticizing applications of trespass); Dan L. Burk, The Trouble with
Trespass, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 27 (2000). Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of
Bidder's Edge, Inc., Appellant, Supporting Reversal at 19, Bidder's Edge, Inc. v. eBay, Inc.
(9th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-15995) (stating that the decision in eBay "threatens the very
foundations of the Web").
54. See, e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital
Anticommons, 91 CAL L. REV. 439, 502 (2003).
55. Id. at 508 ("We can say goodbye to new types of search engines that affect-in any
way-the business models of the sites that they index."); see also Brief of Amici Curiae in
Support of Bidder's Edge, Inc., Appellant, Supporting Reversal, Bidder's Edge, Inc. v. eBay,
Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 00-15995) (contending that the ability of website owners to exclude
scrapers encourages anticompetitive conduct).
56. See Hunter, supra note 54, at 502.
57. See Epstein, supra note 51, at 74; see also David McGowan, Website Access: The
Case for Consent, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 341 (2003).
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untenable position of having to bargain with an infinite number of
potential trespassers for the right to exclude.58 Thus, just as the court
in eBay reasoned,59 allowing screen-scraping could lead to a death by
a thousand cuts in which the websites are subject to access by as many
unwanted and unauthorized scrapers as choose to target them. Even the
most robust websites would have difficulty anticipating and handling the
levels and patterns of use of their systems.
Note that a rule stating that website owners cannot protect their
property from screen-scrapers except when their computer systems are
on the brink of failure could be problematic. It would be difficult for
website owners to know when and against whom to bring suit and, as a
practical matter, e-commerce businesses would likely be forced to invest
in greater capacity to avoid suffering a system failure. Thus, website
owners would be forced to subsidize trespassers. Further, such a rule
would effectively give poorly-architected websites greater protection than
well-architected sites.
In response to predictions that the protection of property rights in
Internet-related chattels will lead to a wasteful anti-commons, an amicus
curiae brief in Intel argued that such predictions simply bear no
relationship to reality.'
Website owners will no more bar large
numbers of Internet users from their property than shopkeepers would
ask large numbers of customers to leave the premises. But if a
shopkeeper asks a patron to leave the premises, such a request should
be honored.
Also, one commentator suggested that the trespass theory is capable
of balancing competing interests in Internet disputes.6 ' Indeed, as
discussed in Section rV, courts have been carefully balancing interests.
The underlying point of the critics is that they simply disagree with the
usual outcome of that balancing, namely the protection of the private
property rights of website owners against trespassers.
IV.

INTEL CORP. V. HAMIDI

Despite the academic criticisms, the trend among courts in enjoining
website trespasses by screen-scrapers has been steady. Last summer,

58. See Epstein, supra note 51, at 74.
59. 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1066.
60. See Amicus Brief of California Employment Law Council, et al. at 35-37, Intel Corp.
v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003) (No. S103781); see also McGowan, supra note 57, at 37172.
61. See Richard Warner, BorderDisputes:Trespass to Chattelson the Internet,47 VILL.
L. REv. 117, 119 (2002).
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however, in Intel Corp. v. Hamidi,62 the California Supreme Court in
a 4-3 decision re-evaluated California law on trespass-to-chattels and
overturned an injunction issued on that basis.' The case concerned a
former Intel employee who aired his grievances with the company by
sending mass e-mails to internal Intel addresses criticizing the
company's employment policies. After he refused to stop sending the
messages, and after Intel was unable to block the messages, the
on trespass-tocompany sued and won a preliminary injunction based
6
chattels. An appellate court upheld the injunction. 4
The
Subsequently, the state supreme court granted review.6 5
supreme court exhaustively reviewed treatises and textbooks on tort law,
and the majority decided that Intel should not be granted an injunction
to prevent Hamidi from sending messages.' The majority suggested
that Hamidi may have committed a technical trespass," but without
any evidence that the e-mails threatened the integrity of Intel's
computer system, the company was limited to self-help as a remedy.6"
Based on its ruling with respect to the trespass claim, the majority did
not address whether there was state action sufficient to support
Hamidi's claim that an injunction would violate his First Amendment
rights.6 9
Two Justices vehemently dissented. One dissenter suggested that the
majority harbored "antipathy toward property rights," and "contempt for
grubby commerce and reverence for the rarified heights of intellectual
discourse."7" The dissenters argued, among other points, that when selfhelp is futile, an owner should be granted an injunction to stop a
repetitive trespass, even if there is no physical harm to the chattel.7 1
By allowing some "public" access to its e-mail system, Intel did not
forfeit the right to exclude whomever it wished from accessing its
property.72 A homeowner who connects her private driveway to a
does not give up the right to keep others from parking in
public street 73
the driveway.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

71
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
at 308-11.
at 300-01.
at 302.
at 302-12.
at 303.
at 312.
at 311.
at 314, 325 (Brown, J., dissenting).
at 313-25 (Brown, J., dissenting); id. at 325-32 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
at 313-25 (Brown, J., dissenting); id. at 325-32 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
at 313-25 (Brown, J., dissenting); id. at 325-32 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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Because of its lengthy discussion of trespass-to-chattels, Intel will be
important for future cybertrespass cases.7 4 The decision might appear
to mark a reversal of the trend toward enforcement of private property
rights in cyberspace. it may embolden screen-scrapers, at least in
California,75 to establish business models that do not include the
consent of the target website.
However, the fundamental character of screen-scraping disputes is
that they are purely commercial. The prospect of substantial commercial
harm to the screen-scraping target cannot be discounted in understanding what courts consider important in enjoining trespasses. Perhaps the
co-founder of Bidder's Edge put it best, saying, "It is one thing for
customers to use a tool to check a site and quite another for a single
commercial enterprise to do so on a repeated basis and then to distribute

74. In addition to trespass-to-chattels, website owners have many possible causes of
action against screen-scrapers, and courts have enjoined scrapers under a variety of
theories. For example, website owners typically provide access to their property subject
to certain terms and conditions stated in a user agreement. Thus, when use of the site
constitutes agreement to the terms, website owners have a valid breach of contract claim.
For example, the court in American Airlines, Inc. v. FareChase,Inc., No. 067-194022-02
(67th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Texas, Mar. 8, 2003) based its injunction in part on
FareChase's violation of the AA.com User Agreement's prohibition of access for commercial
purposes or access by a robot, spider, or other automated device. Id. at 4. Moreover,
assent is usually not problematic in these cases because screen-scrapers have actual
knowledge of the terms of the user agreement, and their violation of such agreements is
intentional. In fact, at the time of the American Airlines litigation, FareChase's own
website contained terms and conditions (1) providing that use of the site constituted assent
to the terms; (2) limiting use of the site to "personal use;" and, remarkably, (3) prohibiting
access of its site using any "robot, spider, or other automated device." FareChase.com User
Agreeement and Terms & Conditions, at http'J/www.farechase.com/farechase/website/
terms.jsp (on file with Mercer Law Review).
Other possible causes of action include, but are not limited to, the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000); state computer crime statutes, see e.g., American
Airlines, Inc. v. FareChase, Inc., No. 067-194022-02 (67th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Texas,
Mar. 8, 2003) (stating that FareChase may have violated section 33.02 of the Texas Penal
Code); and misappropriation.
Furthermore, when the scraper essentially distributes the website owner's product
without authorization, there are many varieties of harm that scrapers can inflict on a
target company's image or reputation. For example, the scraper's representations to the
public regarding itself and the target website owners' products could create false
implications of a business relationship between the company and the scraper. In such
situations, problems that customers may encounter with the scraping product may injure
the goodwill of the target company.
75. Website owners whose property is located outside of California may avail
themselves of potentially more favorable understandings of trespass in other states. See,
e.g., Hawkins v. Hawkins, 400 S.E.2d 472,475 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (suggesting that actual
damage is not an essential element of trespass to chattels).
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that information for profit."76 Companies such as eBay, Register.com,
and American Airlines all invested millions of dollars in creating an
online presence and using their websites to distribute products. And
screen-scrapers, regardless of the nuances of each case, undermined
those investments by using their targets' computers and computer
capacity against their wishes for profit.
In Intel, in addition to the fact that the company produced little
evidence of a threat to its computer system, Hamidi did not appear to
compromise any core aspect of the company's business. To be sure, his
messages were an annoyance 77 -employees were forced to delete them,
and their criticisms of the company caused a stir-but despite Hamidi's
best efforts, his messages were unlikely to cause massive commercial
harm.7 s
The court in Intel did not believe that the company had suffered any
sort of irreparable harm to support an injunction, regardless of whether
there was harm to the chattel. 71 In contrast, the spammers in CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.s° caused the company to lose
customers."' Additionally, in eBay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc.,2
Bidder's Edge compromised eBay's license agreements with other auction
aggregation sites.' The court in eBay even noted that the way eBay
fashioned its request for relief was a "tactical effort" to strengthen its
license negotiating position.' Similarly, in Register.com, Inc. v. Verio,

76. eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1062.
77. One court recently adopted an attitude of resignation regarding the daily
annoyances of the Internet today: "Alas, we computer users must endure pop-up
advertising along with her ugly brother unsolicited bulk email, 'spare', as a burden of using
the Internet." U-Haul Intl, Inc. v. Whenu.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 725 (E.D. Va.
2003) ("Computer users, like this trial judge, may wonder what we have done to warrant
the punishment of seizure of our computer screens by pop-up advertisements for secret web
cameras, insurance, travel values, and fad diets.").
78. Intel, 71 P.3d at 304-05. The dissenters in Intel disagreed, finding that Hamidi's
messages caused the following harms: (1) time spent deleting 200,000 email messages; (2)
affront to its dignitary interest in ownership; (3) the use of Intel's property by another; (4)
increased Internet access fees due to span; (5) wasted employee time in sorting, reading,
and discarding the messages; (6) decreases in the equipment's processing power causing
slowness; (7) costs of efforts to block the messages; and (8) diminished employee
productivity. Id. at 322-23 (Brown, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 303 ("A fortiori, to issue an injunction without a showing of likely irreparable
injury in an action for trespass to chattels, in which injury to the personal property or the
possessor's interest in it is an element of the action, would make little legal sense.").
80. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
81. Id. at 1023.
82. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
83. Id. at 1067-68.
84. Id. at 1064 n.9.
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Inc., Verio undermined the protections that Register.com had in place
for its registrants against certain solicitations. 6 Likewise, in Oyster
Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc. 8' FPI diverted customers away
from Oyster Software's website.-- And in American Airlines, Inc. v.
FareChase,Inc.,89 FareChase undermined American's efforts to reduce
the huge booking fees it paid each year.90
Furthermore, part of the commercial harm of screen-scraping is freeridership. In Thrifty-Tel Inc. v. Bezenek, 9 eBay, Register.com, and
American Airlines, but not in Intel,92 the trespassers were essentially
doing something for free that non-trespassers had to pay for. The teens
in Thrifty-tel were trying to access long distance codes without paying. 3 In eBay it appears that eBay had license agreements with other
auction sites allowing them to monitor eBay's auctions, but Bidder's
Edge was doing the same thing for free.94 Register.com sold its new
registrant listings to some companies for $10,000 per month, but Verio
was using Register.com's own system to do it for free, and in a way that
hurt Register.com's business.9" Moreover, in American Airlines, the
airline had embarked upon a substantial program to allow traditional
travel agents to offer its webfares as part of a deal in which the travel
agents would pay some of American Airlines's booking fees. FareChase
then tried to distribute webfares to travel agents for its own profit and
without reducing American Airlines's overall booking-fee bill.9"
Not surprisingly, in balancing the competing interests in these
commercial cases, courts have focused more on the protection of property
rights than on the generalized goal of furthering the free flow of
information. 9 After all, courts are accustomed to enforcing property

85. 126 F. Supp. 2d 238 (S.D. N.Y. 2000).
86. Id. at 251-52.
87. No. C-00-0724JCS, 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
88. Id. at *1-2.
89. No. 87-194022-02 (67th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Texas, Mar. 8, 2003) (order
granting temporary injunction), available at http'//www.eff.org/Cases/AA-vFareChase/
20030310_preliminj.pdf.
90. Id. at *3.
91. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
92. But see Intel, 71 P.3d at 324 (Brown, J., dissenting) (describing Hamidi as a "freerider"). The free-rider label does not fit as neatly on Hamidi, an individual e-mailer.
93. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471.
94. 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1067-68.
95. 126 F. Supp. 2d at 242-43.
96. No. 067-194022-02, at *1-2 (67th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Texas, Mar. 8, 2003).
97. One commentator described the relevant balancing as that between "a business'
interest in controlling access to its premises" and "the interest of all Internet users in lowcost, worldwide communication and unimpeded access to information." Warner, supranote
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rights of individuals, whereas furthering broad public policy goals is a
legislative function.98 In eBay, for example, the court simply did not
believe the Internet would "cease to function," no matter how the court
ruled.9" The court was, of course, correct. Moreover, the court in
CompuServe assessed that "the public interest is advanced by the
Court's protection of the common law rights of individuals and entities
to their personal property.""°
Intel involved none of this. Rather, Intel concerned a lone, former
employee acting not for profit but for personal motives. Although he was
using Intel's private property to distribute his message, Hamidi was not
seeking privileges for free that Intel sold to others. 1 The majority
found there was little chance that hordes of other noncommercial emailers would bombard Intel's system. °2 The majority specifically
contrasted Hamidi with commercial spammers. 1°3 Therefore, absent
in Intel was the sort of business dynamic that often justifies courts in
enjoining scrapers.
Also, the court in Intel indicated that the company did not satisfy its
self-help obligations." 4 Hamidi offered to remove any employee from
his mailing list upon that employee's request. Intel could have
instructed all its employees to respond to Hamidi accordingly, and, if
Hamidi is taken at his word, the problem would have subsided.0 5 In
screen-scraping cases, there tend to be few self-help options other than

61, at 119.
98. In discussing the public interest element of an injunction, one court recognized
that it is "poorly suited" to make public policy and decide the appropriate balance between
.encouraging the exchange of information and preserving economic incentives to create."
eBay, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1072.
99. Id.
100. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1028.
101. Intel, 71 P.3d at 301-02.
102. Id. (noting that Intel did not show "any likelihood that Hamidi's actions will be
replicated by others if found not to constitute a trespass"). The success of so-called "gripesites" should be noted, however. See John Yaukey, Gotta Gripe? Sites Let You Whine
Online, http:J/www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/ccyauO22.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2003)
(describing gripe-sites). Many gripe-sites are targeted at specific companies.
103. Intel, 71 P.3d at 306.
104. Id. at 312. Justice Mosk contended that the company had attempted all
reasonable self-help. See, e.g., id. at 329 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk noted that
Intel attempted to put a stop to Hamidi's intrusions by increasing its electronic
screening measures and by requesting that he desist. Only when self-help proved
futile, devolving into a potentially endless joust between attempted prevention and
circumvention, did Intel request and obtain equitable relief in the form of an
injunction to prevent further threatened injury.
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 301.

2004]

SCREEN-SCRAPING

1025

the usual ineffective blocking efforts. The law encourages property
owners to take reasonable steps to protect their property from trespassers. Few courts would be eager to help a company that could easily help
itself. But when an owner is helpless to stop a repetitive trespass,
courts considering a request for an injunction may look to the maxim
that "equity will not suffer a right without a remedy.""0 6
One dynamic Intel did involve, however, was that of an individual
claiming to exercise his First Amendment right of free speech.' 7
Hamidi's First Amendment argument against an injunction was far from
a sure bet, but it is important in understanding the case. Hamidi
claimed that he was trying to provide "an extremely important forum for
employees within an international corporation to communicate via a web
page on the internet and via electronic mail, on common labor issues,
that, due to geographical and other limitations, would not otherwise be
possible."' 8
As a threshold matter, these First Amendment concerns would be
inapplicable without state action. The court in CompuServe earlier held
that an injunction against a spammer would not constitute state action
for First Amendment purposes. 109 The majority in Intel chose not to
rule on the state action question, but the majority was concerned about
the speech issues Hamidi raised." ° The majority went out of its way
to respond to the dissenters' arguments that there was no state
action,"' even though that part of the opinion is dicta.
The court of appeals in Intel stated, "Content discrimination is part of
a private property-owner's bundle of rights."" 2 But the supreme court
majority repeatedly took exception to the fact that Intel objected to
Hamidi's messages solely because of their content rather than their
While this ostensibly concerns whether any threat to
quantity."'

106. See id. at 330 (Mosk., J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 301.
108. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 246-47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); see
Lemley, supra note 22, at 542 (describing Hamidi's actions as "desirable social conduct").
109. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1025-26 (following Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 443-44 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
110. Intel, 71 P.3d at 311-12.
111. Id.
112. Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255.
113. Intel, 71 P.3d at 300-01 (distinguishing CompuServe and its progeny as based on
the quantity, rather than content of the objectionable unsolicited e-mail); id. at 304 (noting
that the "mere sending of electronic communications that assertedly cause injury only
because of their contents [does not] constitute[] an actionable trespass to a computer
system through which the messages are transmitted"); id. at 307 (observing that Intel's
workers "were allegedly distracted from their work not because of the frequency or quantity
of Hamidi's messages, but because of the assertions and opinions the messages conveyed.
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Intel's computer system existed, the free-speech undertones of content
discrimination are apparent. The dissenting opinion in the lower court
claimed that an injunction against Hamidi would "transform[] a tort
meant to protect possessory interests into one that merely attacks
4
speech.""
Further evidence that the majority considered this a case about speech
is its suggestion that the company pursue speech-related torts rather
than trespass."' Finally, one dissenter in Intel described the balancing of interests in the case as that between "expressive activity and
property protection."" 6
The interests of screen-scrapers, in contrast, do not call to mind the
same free-speech concerns. Far from the individual speaking out in the
public square against some societal injustice, screen-scrapers are purely
commercial actors out to make a profit by accessing others' personal
property against their wishes. Moreover, such commercial speech is
entitled to little protection." 7 In screen-scraping cases, expressive
activity is not in the balance the same way as it was in Intel.
V.

CONCLUSION

Intel's noncommercial background, combined with its apparent free
speech concerns and the company's possible self-help option, place the
case in a different category from typical screen-scraping cases. Indeed,
the court in Intel did not reject the trespass theory entirely, but
essentially found Hamidi's trespasses to be de minimis violations."'
The "simple proposition that owners of computer systems, like owners
of other private property, have a right to prevent others from using their
property against their interests"" 9 will likely continue to prevail when
trespassers pose substantial commercial harm to property owners. Thus,
the trend of courts enjoining screen-scraper trespasses is likely to

Intel's complaint is thus about the contents of the messages rather than the functioning of
the company's e-mail system"); id. at 308 (rejecting a property rule making senders liable
for the contents of the communication).
114. Intel, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264 (Kolkey, J., dissenting).
115. See Intel, 71 P.3d at 300-01 (reasoning that "third party subjects of e-mail
communications may under appropriate facts make claims for defamation, publication of
private facts, or other speech-based torts"); see also id. at 330 (noting that the causes of
action the majority suggests would require content analysis) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 314 (Brown, J., dissenting).
117. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that commercial speech holds a "subordinate
position in the scale of First Amendment values." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
118. Intel, 71 P.3d at 303-08.
119. Id. at 329 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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continue after Intel. The decision in Intel is a poor vehicle for assessing
the interests of website owners against screen-scrapers, and it should not
be misperceived to justify a broad license for screen-scrapers to trespass
and to use the property of others without consent.
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